Yohanan Plesner
Israel’s Constitutional Crisis, Its Origins and Potential Outcomes
Yohanan Plesner - Israel’s Constitutional Crisis: Its Origins and Potential Outcomes
- Thank you everybody for joining us for something I’ve been looking forward to all week because despite reading many, many hours of the Israeli headlines, there’s nobody better I can think of to help us make sense of what’s going on on the ground in Israel than Yohanan. So Yohanan, thank you for coming back to what I think is your third or fourth time now on Lockdown University.
Yeah, thanks for having me. And it reminds me of the good old COVID days.
So Yohanan Plesner is the President of the Israeli Democracy Institute. Plesner grew up in Jerusalem and served as a soldier and officer in the IDFs Elite Sayeret Matkal unit, in which he still serves as an active officer in reserve duty. He graduated Magna Cum Laude with a BA in Economics from Hebrew University. He also holds an MPA in political economy and international security from Harvard Kennedy School of Government. His business experience includes time as a senior analyst position at a management consultancy firm in London, as well as holding the role and of CEO and Co-Founder at the International Enterprise Software Company based in Israel, the US and Canada. In 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon appointed Plesner, Head of Special Projects in the Prime Minister’s office. In 2006, he became the First Secretary General of Israel’s new ruling party, Kadima and spearheaded the creation of the party’s organisational infrastructure. From 2007 to 2013, he served as a member of Knesset and was a member of the Constitution Law, Justice, Defence, and Foreign Affairs Committees. Committees that are going to serve us well to understand today. He was also the co-chair of the Knesset lobby for Higher Education and Chairman of the Knesset Permanent Delegation to the Council of Europe. In 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu who appointed Plesner to head the Committee for Equality in the Burden of Service, which produced a blueprint for incorporating the ultra-orthodox community into military and national service, one of the most complex social economic challenges facing the state of Israel. So Yohanan, and we’re going to see in the next hour how much we can do to help people understand from a distance seems to be a very complex and very concerning situation. So I’d like to start at the beginning and ask you to effectively explain in layman’s terms, what is the current challenge or the current situation around the Israeli judicial reform?
Well, you know, so-called reform or judicial overhaul, even, you know, the terminology obviously matters. This is what’s at stake now and has been the main, if not the only issue on the public, on the new government’s agenda over the past couple of months. And it’s difficult to imagine, but it’s a government that has been established only two months ago, just at the beginning of January. And what they are promoting in the Knesset is a judicial overhaul, it’s a cluster of initiatives that the aggregate implication of, if all of them will be implemented is concentrating all governing power in the hands of the executive branch. So basically to allow politicians from the coalition to nominate judges, to override a judicial review decisions over the parliament to significantly limit the judicial review decisions over the executive branch. So in to sort of capture and politicise the process of appointing the heads of legal departments of ministries in the government with the idea of having sort of political operatives rather than professional lawyers as in the positions that are in charge of ensuring that the government operates based on the rule of law. So when you look at the whole sort of, rather than looking at each individual initiative, when you look at the whole thing in aggregate, it’s a fundamental, it constitutes a fundamental change to the system of checks and balances in Israel. No more institutional checks and balances, but rather concentrating all power in the hands of the executive. There’s also been talk of minimising, if not overturning, the one law that constitutes our bill of rights, which is basic law or human dignity and freedom. We don’t have a bill of rights and all of this is taking place in a democracy that does not have a constitution. So to fundamentally change the character of the state, the rules of the game, the balance of power or the checks and balances, and the constitutional rights for all of that, you need a simple majority of half of the Knesset members plus one. We always knew that we are a country without a constitution, but we never imagined that a little more than half of the Knesset members will have the courage or the recklessness to initiate such a change without consensus in a process that is extremely aggressive and so on. And this explains why so many Israelis are now protesting in a wave of protests that we’ve never seen since the foundation of the state. So it wouldn’t be an exaggeration, Carly, to say that we are experiencing probably the most severe internal crisis in the country’s history.
So let’s talk practical examples for a minute. I don’t want to go through every component of the changes, but let’s help people understand two or three examples of the types of decisions now the Knesset could overturn or the types of changes that we might see on the ground in Israel if these various reforms overhauls restrictions pass.
Well, so again, you see here on the screen it’s a cluster of initiatives, I mentioned some of them. But the implication of removing or undermining the independence of the judiciary rule of law, no safeguard for human rights. Those are the basic tenets of every functioning democracy. It’s basically reducing our democracy. Again, if this package of legislation is implemented and it’s reducing our democracy to the one principle that is obviously an important component of democracy, which is majority rule, but it cannot be the only component of democracy, of any functioning democracy under any minimalistic definition, should also include the separation of powers, a rule of law, protection of minorities, human rights, and so on. So none of these will be guaranteed. One are the practical implications, and I believe this is your question. For example, we can see some of the implications already hidden or not so hidden, actually exposed, revealed in the coalition agreements. So there’s an attempt to demand of the ultra-orthodox parties to create segregated spheres in the public sphere between men and women. There won’t be a supreme court that will be able to overrule such a decision. There is an attempt, again, it appears in the coalition and negotiation to allow small and medium sized businesses to discriminate in the provision of services based on faith.
So if I’m, you know, I have a certain religious faith I can, and I own a venue for events, I can deny service from say, a gay couple or things like that. So this is actually also, it appears in the coalition negotiation, the fact that the judiciary will no longer be independent. And there’s also an attempt, it’s not included in phase one, but there’s also an intention that was declared to politicise the role of the, to split up the role of the attorney general and to politicise the appointment of the state prosecutor basically, a political appointment. So if you take that, it might also undermine Israel’s perception in the international community as having an independent judiciary, and independent law enforcement system, which might threaten our soldiers and combatants as they go overseas. Because so far the main protection vis-a-vis the ICC, the International Criminal Court in the Hague. And ICJ, was the fact that we have an independent court system and this is why they should not intervene. They do not have jurisdiction as a result of that. So there’s a fear and some of the fighter pilots are now voicing it. Many of our fighter pilots are reservists, hundreds of them. And they’re saying, if I don’t have adequate legal protection as I then go to mind my own business and do my high-tech stuff or whatever it is and go overseas for business, I could be arrested. So there’s a real issue there as well. The court played an important role in ensuring equality, for example, in the service of women in the military opening up service tracks and so on. So this might also be at risk, so many aspects of Israel’s public sphere matters of religion and state the attitude towards non-orthodox streams of Judaism. So many aspects. And of course my, and I’ll end with that, Carly, if you politicise all of those elements, both appointment of judges at all levels, there’s a big risk also that it paves the way for corruption increase in the frequency in cases of corruption because there are no proper safeguards. So again, I don’t think based on what I said, that my opinion on those cluster of initiatives is not exactly difficult to identify.
But I am going to push you because in the 10 years or so that we’ve been having these conversations, you’ve been a big advocate for reform in Israel for, you know, looking at some of these concerns. You know, there obviously isn’t a constitution. Everybody always knew that the nature of the fragile, unstable coalitions in Israel would open up to these kinds of potential for, you know, a small group with a radical approach to kind of drag the country from post to post. So is there any positives in these reforms that you can see, or elements that you think are worthy of consideration?
Well, you know, one positive thing, obviously Israel is, you know, is torn. And the level of division within Israeli society is at an all-time high and, you know, some very heartbreaking phenomena are being exposed, including, you know, some threats of many reservists that if this package passes, they they will not serve anymore. There’s also a sense of, you know, it’s passed in a very aggressive manner, changing the fundamental character of the state in such an aggressive manner by a government that, you know, the heads of the, except for one head of faction, Netanyahu himself, who was obviously under indictment and did, and has a personal interest in undermining the legal system. The other heads of the parties never served in the military themselves. You know, the ultra-orthodox members, Ben-Gvir, who’s been prosecuted so many times, Smotrich himself, that served the tiny insignificant military service, so many reservists feel there’s this cluster of people never served, changing the nature of the very nature of Israel’s Jewish and democratic character exposing us to legal risks and so on. So there’s a major underlying sense of aggravation. So this is the negative in terms of what it does to Israeli society. What is the positive? Number one, I’ve never encountered such a moment of democratic awakening. So, you know, as the head of the Israel Democracy Institute, you know, there’s a flood of, you know-
You’ve been pleased to see people joining you in their concerns for democracy.
No, but it’s not only about concerns, it’s about, you know, thinking about constitutional matters and how come we’re a democracy without a constitution? What are the possible solutions? I mean, so there is a real, in a sense, it’s a constitutional moment. We’re entering into a constitutional moment where people all of a sudden realise, you know, 70% of secular Israelis are now fearful. And I’m speaking about results of surveys, and that’s before that began it’s results of last year, 70% of secular Israelis were fearful that they won’t be able to live in Israel based on their way of life. 70%, that’s before this whole cluster. I’m sure if we measure it now, it will be… Yeah, that’s from December 2022. I’m sure if we measure it now, it will be even higher than that given, you know, the kind of legislation that was promoted. And so there’s an understanding that we need to promote, hopefully a fully fledged constitution, but at a minimum, the basic constitutional, the minimum constitutional chapters that are required in order to stabilise the rules of the game, to ensure an independent court and to ensure that our basic rights and freedoms are guaranteed. So there’s a moment now that Israelis understand, well, we need it. So if before they were fearful, now they want to turn it into a constitutional moment. So we, as IDI, Israel Democracy Institute, for years, we’ve been promoting this notion of constitution and consensus. And while we, you know, while people like Carly had interest in that, you know, the general public cared about security, education and you know, constitutional debate was sort of debate for policy one-on-one for the advanced.
Now my daughter that serves in the IDF asks me, you know, she’s a combatant, and she’s like, are my rights not guaranteed? Do they want to change the status of women in the military? How can we safeguard it? So, I mean, so there’s a moment here. So that’s number one. And number two, perhaps if we’re looking for a positive, obviously a crisis, and the fact I it’s pushing us for a moment of clarity, a moment, you know, we’re near the edge and hopefully it’ll provide us strong enough incentive to come together rather than deepen the crisis. Now, and having said that, obviously, there are things that ought to be fixed and changed and modified within our constitutional system, and the law enforcement systems. Obviously, politicisation is not one of them, but we need to, you know, strengthen the independence of the judiciary. It’s not currently the case. we need to ensure that it’s more diverse, which is one of the contentions of the serious people that wanted reform. Many wanted reform, but not this kind of reform. So they wanted a judiciary that is more reflective of more views, especially the Supreme Court within Israeli society. So this is a worthy goal. What we’re seeing here on the screen are the sort of basic constitutional chapters that are required in order to turn this moment from a moment of crisis to a constitutional moment. So obviously there is what to fix, but moving in a sort of aggressive process that changes the very character of the state with a simple Knesset majority obviously, is not the way to go to go about it.
So how did this, you know, become an issue number one on the government’s agenda? You know, when Netanyahu had the kind of government celebration party and talked about his goals, this was nowhere near the list of things mentioned. So how is it that this has suddenly become, you know, the issue that the government is pushing forwards?
Well, it wouldn’t surprise you that sometimes the priorities of politicians are different than the priorities of the general public, and even their own voters. So yeah, Mr. Netanyahu who’s a very keen follower and reader of Israeli public opinion, and ran on a campaign of cost of living and you know, reducing the cost of living, strengthening the economy, improving the personal security, I.e. both vis-a-vis crime protection, crimes and so on, and terror. So this was the agenda and a sort of, he blamed much of the sort of rise in terror that we’ve experienced, and the fact that there was an Islamist party in the coalition, and that sort of made sense to our large number of Israelis who were persuaded to vote for Mr. Netanyahu. Let’s remember that the Netanyahu camp is 2.3 million voters voted for the pro Netanyahu camp and 2.3 million voters voted against. So even then, you know, Israel was split by down the middle. Nevertheless, Mr. Netanyahu is the legitimate winner of this election and formed the legitimate government. The agenda again, was the economy and with security in the eyes of the people. But once the government was established, it was the a hundred percent of the attention was focused on this judicial overhaul. There’s a cluster, I think a combination of three interests, interest number one, ultra-orthodox parties that are sort of at an all-time high in terms of their political power because they have many seats, 18 seats, the two ultra-orthodox parties. And they understand that Mr. Netanyahu’s political faith depends 100% on his collaboration with them. He has no alternative for them as a result of the fact the way Israeli politics is currently structured.
So they want to maximise their power, and for them, an independent court is a court that doesn’t allow them to fulfil their agendas in the political sphere, both in terms of dramatic increase of budgets for their institutions, an exemption, an overall exemption for military service changes in Israel’s public sphere in terms of segregation between men and women, increasing the role in civic matters of the rabbinical court. So they have a hefty agenda, both for the upcoming few years and as a vision for Israel, and a strong independent court is not conducive to promoting this agenda. So this is the number one interest, the ultra-orthodox parties. The number two, Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, those two parties, they have interest in terms of, you know, in the settlements for example, they don’t like the court interfering and constraining their ability to establish more outposts and so on. So they want this sort of, those degrees of freedom. There’s also something I think, psychological with the court that has to do with the disengagement, I won’t get into it, but there is something that has to do with it as well. And although the court’s makeup have dramatic, has very much changed over the past few years, and it’s a lot more reflective of broad views in Israeli society, there’s still this perception that, you know, it’s a fortress that needs to be overtaken.
And of course, there’s Netanyahu who was the traditionally Likud party led by Netanyahu, and Netanyahu himself was a big protector of the court because it’s, you know, the Likud is the defender of liberal values. It’s a liberal, historically a liberal national party, it promotes freedom, the original name of Likud is Herut, Herut is freedom, Begin had a strong agenda of strong independent courts as a staunch liberal and so on. So that was the traditional Likud view and the Likud actually played a very important role in strengthening the courts, solidifying its authorities and its independence and Netanyahu abided by this tradition. But over the past few years, Netanyahu took a different course. It has obviously has to do with the fact that he was indicted and that he has to fight for his, you know, very freedom within the court system. And now there’s a different agenda that is very aggressive and anti-court. So obviously, he doesn’t need this entire overhaul in order to legislate his way out of his legal process. But now it began, it rolled as a snowball and he appointed Yariv Levin, a staunch anti-judiciary ideologue. So the combination of-
It’s a man who spent 10 years in the corner trying to get people to listen to him on the need for the-
Oh yeah, and Yariv Levin, he’s a very smart, very capable, very efficient politician. We were actually, I mean, close friends, we served as members of Knesset together. We promoted many pieces of legislation together at the time, including electoral reform and other aspects. But he was always a very… He was a hardliner with respect to the judiciary, but a complete sort of outlier. And now this sort of very, very extreme position of Levine he became the sort of minister.
The negotiator, yeah.
Not only does he call the shots because he’s the justice minister, but the coalition agreement stipulate that all parties are committed and obligated to immediately legislate whatever he brings. And Netanyahu is forbidden from participating in this process because of his conflict of interest agreement. Again, because he’s an accused, he’s been indicted and he’s accused in court-
Let’s talk about his indictment kind of straight on for a minute. You know, there’s lots of headlines and in the US or UK presses, you know, it’s hard to kind of make sense of the pistachio ice cream and the cigars, and maybe the submarines and, you know, where the whole process has got to. My understanding is June, July when, you know, the next round of testifying and some of the kind of key witnesses appear is the moment to watch out for. But where are we on the indictment and what does that mean for the judicial overhaul?
Well, leave the pistachio ice cream outside, it’s not connected to anything, it just reminded me that I didn’t have dinner. But, and the submarines, there’s a separate independent inquiry commission that is inquiring into this entire process of the submarine affair. It’s not only about Netanyahu, it’s the entire process of submarine purchases from the Germans, but it’s not connected to the Netanyahu indictment. He was indicted on three different cases. And the legal, you know, he was indicted, I think back in 2019. The indictment was already served and the legal process is taking place. He has very capable lawyers who are excellent in stalling the process forever really, and so it’s a very long process. It will take probably around, you know, don’t quote me on that, but perhaps two more years or something until a decision will be made. And in the meantime, it wouldn’t probably surprise you too much, that at least what’s been published is that he has plans on replacing the attorney general who’s basically the prosecutor that is prosecuting him and politicising the process of appointment. So he basically wants to be able to appoint the prosecutor that will prosecute him and perhaps reach a plea bargain. But that’s, again, speculation. Netanyahu so far is actually using this long extended legal process as a way to fire up his own base positioning everything, his persecution and so on. And there’s a significant portion of Israeli public that is absolutely persuaded that this whole process is invented and not based on anything, and so on. I guess you don’t want me to get into the accusations? It’s-
I think, we’ll keep it to the high level for now. I’m sure on our next chat we can come back round. So, you know, we’ve laid out what are the issues on the table. What do you see as the potential compromise between the parties? And, you know, late last night, early this morning, President Herzog said he felt that the closed door discussions were approaching some form of opportunity. Now, the government has said it will not cause the legislation while those discussions are going on, the opposition has said, if there is no pause of the legislation, there is no discussions to be had. So first of all, you know, what opportunity do you see for President Herzog? But as you came on the call, you also said that the terms had leaked. So what does that mean for the discussion ahead?
Well, yeah, it’s basically, President Herzog sort of has the last safe haven for discussion in the country because our politics became so divided. The coalition is moving, you know, full steam ahead with this package of legislation that we have described before, and the opposition is obviously opposing it. And there are massive protests. Last Saturday, more than 300,000 Israelis came out, only more than 160,000 in Tel Aviv, 40,000 in Haifa, almost 20,000 in Netanya. I mean, it’s something that is difficult to imagine, 20,000 in for Saba, a huge amount in Jerusalem. I mean, throughout the country, Be'er Sheva, as you see in the figures, among the Jewish population, 15% said in January 23rd that they participated at least once. And the protests became a lot more intensive and massive, we’re up to an assessment of around close to 25% of the Jewish population that participated in the protests, physically came out, 25% of the population of the Jewish population. If you take, you know, the American equivalent, you know, you do the math, you know, 80 million Americans, so that’s the equivalent. So it’s something that is mind boggling. So obviously it has huge implications and the protests are just gaining a greater momentum. The president and the opposition is requiring at least a halt suspension of legislation as a condition for negotiation. And Levine, the Justice Minister says not even a second. So that’s the status. The President Herzog tried to convene groups, I would say, of experts to try and put a sort of a reasonable proposal of, I would say, to turn this moment into a constitutional moment.
Now that this process is out, like, you know, it’s been published that we’ve also been advising the president. Obviously he didn’t take all of our advice, but significant parts of it. So, and apparently just an hour ago it wasn’t leaked, but it was somebody who’s been working on the wording for the president on the president’s document has by accident sent the document in a large WhatsApp group. And so now it’s been published, which is quite ironic. Now they’re saying it’s only a draught and it’s not exactly the president’s, but it gives us an idea of what’s included in this document.
So if, if, if, if there will be agreement around it, so there’s one area that is still problematic, which is the system of appointment of judges. And you see there that there’s the justice minister basically insists on political coalition control over the appointment of judges, which is obviously problematic because you can have a wonderful constitution and a fabulous bill of rights like you have in some of the South American countries, but then people are still vanishing in the streets because there are no independent worthy, high quality judges that can interpret the constitution. So obviously, the system of appointment of judges needs to be balanced in a way to ensure that there’s no coalition control. Not directly, not indirectly, but otherwise, what was put forward by the president is, I would say is a start of a very interesting conversation that if modified is somewhat modified and then implemented for the first time, will provide Israel with the basic, the minimum basic constitutional chapters that are required in order to guarantee the system of checks and balances, to guarantee some of the basic rights. And basically to create a sort of a long-term truce with respect to the constitutional areas. So again, this is what the president thinks can be the foundation for a consensus. There are some gaps still. We still have to see that the coalition wants to implement it and not just to use it as a way to turn off the protest because, you know, to say, well, we generally agree to it, the protestors will sort of relax a little, and then since the coalition controls the Knesset in a hundred percent, then they can make a few tweaks and changes, which will entirely change the whole thing and then continue with it. So, I mean, it’s too early to tell whether this process is actually leading us to a truce, but it’s definitely a step in the right direction.
So let’s talk about this piece around the appointment of judges and let’s say for example, look at the US system, you know, where we all know that the role of the independence of the judiciary, but also the kind of political nature of the appointment of judges often causes concern and disagreement amongst US society, but that’s the structure. So how is what’s being advocated for here different to what we may see in the US system, for example?
Well, in the US system, which is obviously not necessarily a model, because as you mentioned, I mean, we should copy the good things from America, not necessarily the things that are not functioning so well. But nevertheless, in America you have a president proposing a candidate for, and then the Senate is not necessarily always controlled. So he needs to make sure a candidate that, so the Senate is independent from the presidency and needs to ratify this appointment. And another different in America is the fact that their lifetime appointments. So in many ways the judges have vast influence on who will replace them because they can time their retirement. And we’ve seen it with Justice Breyer choosing to retire when President Biden had the option of replacing him. So, even in America where it seems like, you know, politicians are doing the whole thing. I just mentioned three different balancing, you know, factors, and America obviously has a rigid constitution, which is a very important balance. And of course, we are only talking in America on the system for appointment at the federal level, whereas the different states have different systems. Here in Israel, what the coalition now is interested in is one committee appointing judges for all levels. You know, a simple political majority of the coalition appointing judges not only for the Supreme Court, but for all levels, even traffic judges or family law judges, and in family courts, and with no other constraints whatsoever. So it’s really better to compare it to other parliamentary democracies like say in Germany where there’s a system that there’s a need for consensus between coalition and opposition. So they need to come together with a very large majority and to agree on candidates to ensure that the judges are sort of beyond petty politics and are not representing one fringe or another. So that’s just the German example, in other places they’re also professional involvements, but generally, various mechanisms that ensure balance and this is what’s problematic in what’s promoted the idea of coalition control over the appointment of judges, which creates the risk of politicisation of this process in a dangerous manner.
And while we’re reflecting on the US, where do you think President Obama could have a role? Do you see any positive intervention by the US government? Obviously, Ambassador Tom Nides has been outspoken since this has started, which seems to be to the annoyance of some members of the government, but where do you see the US role here?
Well, you know, America is our closest ally, and this is the most important strategic alliance. And ever since I was much younger and an APAC activist, when I lived in the US and I worked in high-tech more than 20 years ago, I learned about the equation of shared interests and shared values, and I think it’s the role of America if the American administration thinks that assuming Israel will erode in a significant manner, it’s democratic character. If there are those in America who think that this such an erosion will also over time contribute to an erosion of the relationship, then they should say so because it’s something that needs to be taken into account in Israel. I also think that American jury and American leadership have skilled in the game. Israel has a basic law, so it’s at a constitutional level, we’ve defined ourselves as a nation state of the Jewish people with responsibility, not only over Israel’s population, but with a special connection to the Jewish people throughout the world. And the fact that such changes will, I think disrupt the relationship because it will strengthen one stream of Judaism or the ultra-orthodox strength and the expense of a much more pluralistic Jewish identity in Israel and over time than also disrupt the relationship.
You know, there are ample examples of matters of religion and state, and so on, that if there’s no sort of court as a strong barrier to ensure equality and so on. The Kotel bill, for example, was something that the government put forward after the court made sure that they asked the government to come up with a solution for access to the Kotel. So the court has an important role and I think it will disrupt the relationship. And also, you know, obviously the fact that the US-Israel relationship is strong, has also to do with the fact, you know, with strong involvement of Jewish and the activity of the Jewish community, and if there are those who feel that it will affect their level of involvement and engagement, I would expect them to say so ahead of time before the changes are made and not when it’s too late. So yeah, I think there’s a role for Jewish leadership. I think, again, I wouldn’t give advice to the US administration, but if they think it’s a problem from their vantage point, then they should make their voice heard before changes are made and not when it’s too late.
Now, you know, I don’t want to kind of buy-in to some of the hyperbole that we have seen being thrown around, but there’s big questions about, you know, what does this mean for Israel being a democracy? Is Israel slipping into Hungary as the kind of closest comparison? I did see that somewhat coincidentally, the Hungarian government announced it was moving its embassy to Jerusalem on Friday, which seemed a little on the nose. But, you know, where would you compare Israel’s future to? There’s always been this tension between Jewish and Democratic and how that can be balanced in a country like Israel. You know, what would you compare from a kind of somewhat rational versus emotional view that we may be seeing in the headlines?
Well, so far we had the democracy that we are very proud of and, you know, could compare it to the strong democracies in Western Europe and perhaps even in Scandinavia, although we didn’t have a sort of the constitutional, the institutional safeguards. We nevertheless had the vibrant democracy ensuring, you know, freedoms and freedom of expression and, you know, property rights, and so on. But if those changes, again, I hope it’s not going to be the case, but if those changes are going to be implemented, probably the best analogy would be the kind of changes that took place in Poland and Hungary, sort of the independent, the judiciary becoming sort of an institution that is controlled by the politicians and then other aspects of the democracy are being encroached and minimised, for example, a free media aspect of the free and fair election aspects of civil society, higher education. So clearly, you know, once you lose that bastion of freedom, there’s a risk in an age of populism, age of digital networks that spread toxic populism. And when there are no institutional safeguards, clearly, we should be very wary as we observe the path that the Hungarian and Polish democracy took and it had serious economic, negative economic repercussions for those two countries. We see that the divergence of the economic trajectories of those two countries when you compare them to the other countries in Europe. So those are two examples, but Israel is different because unlike Hungary and Poland, we’re not experiencing an existential threat.
We need the best, smartest and brightest to ensure that our economy continues to thrive and our smart people have options. Everybody wants our entrepreneurs, they’re creating fabulous country companies in Israel that ensured that, you know, during COVID when we spoke, when all of the other economies in the world were going down, our economy was in a sort of peak of tax collection and, you know, but those people are mobile, and they’re saying so now very clearly there’s the high-tech protest of the high-tech industry. They’re saying if there won’t be a strong democracy, there won’t be a strong high-tech in Israel. So there’s a risk for our economy that is not the same as in Hungary that doesn’t enjoy the same sector of entrepreneurship, freedom, vitality, ideas that is very mobile. And this is a huge precious natural resource that we have, which is obviously human resource. And the second threat is obviously that we have an existential threat and we need the smartest and brightest, completely identifying and committed to the state and even willing to risk their lives. And we’re seeing now, just as an example, it’s not them, but that’s the most vivid example. More and more fighter pilots that are reservists, you know, they’re once a week training in order to maintain their competence. And more and more are saying, if Israel is not no longer a real democracy, we’re not going to continue to risk our lives. The entire country is dependent not on sort of a professional army, but on the spirit of Israelis that are willing to risk their lives and to give time, and to continue to serve. And this week there’s a very disconcerting move where 37 or 38 out of 40 fighter pilots of an F-15 squadron said that they’re not showing up.
But are they not showing up as an act of dissent or are they not showing up because they are concerned that they could find themselves exposed in the future? You know, I think the headline is not drilled past what is the actual, is this a protest?
Both.
or it’s a self-preservation?
Both. Very clearly, they’re saying both things and there are many other fighter pilots and many other squadrons were saying. So Israel is not the kind of country, the spirit of Israelis is not designed for a dictatorship. Israelis don’t take orders from anyone, and-
I know, I’ve tried.
Good luck with trying to turn Israel into an autocratic country. I’m seeing now things that I wouldn’t have imagined. You know, mentioned in the opening remarks that I served in Sayeret Matkal, I’m a major in reserves, there’s now a group of reservists of Sayeret Matkal created a group together more than a thousand, now it’s a tiny unit, so it’s pretty much, you know, 80 or 90% of the units veterans. And they’re now organised in teams and with commanders, and platoons, and companies. And you know, last Wednesday when there was a day of protest, it was already like a military operation. Those were blocking road number one, and those were blocking the trains, and Shaldag unit was blocking the trains in the south. So Israeli society is so well-organized because of all these groups of reservists and so on, that it’s very difficult just to sort of like they did in Poland or Hungary just from the top dictate something. So, and the same is with the fighter pilots and so on that are coming together. So Israel very much depends on the spirit of Israelis and they’re not willing to take it.
I think what is reassuring so far, and I wonder if you think it’ll stay, but you know, with the exceptions of from unpleasant water cannons and skunk water, you know, the protests have stayed peaceful. There’s not been… And I say this on the protest, we’ll get to the, not sure exactly what you’re supposed to call it, pogrom, lynching, disruption in a minute. But on the kind of weekly protests in Tel Aviv and the surrounding cities, they have stayed peaceful. They have stayed within the rule of law. As I say, there’s been some water that I’m sure has not been enjoyable, but up until now, you know, it hasn’t descended. Are you optimistic that will continue?
Yeah, generally, the protests were sort of, you know, the police handled them okay, and the protestors themselves are very, you know, committed to a non-violent protest. But as the legislation continues, there are more and more calls for non-violent civil unrest. You know, people are learning models of protests and what Martin Luther King did and Gandhi, and so on in terms of, you know, non-violent, various non-violent measures. There are calls of people to sort of withhold tax payments. I mean, you know, as I mentioned before, it’s not a usual situation. We also have a Homeland Security Minister who is a professional provocateur. He’s been indicted dozens of times for incitement, for violence and also has been found guilty, and he never managed anything, he’s basically a sort of the outcast in Israeli politics for years for being a sort of a racist thug to some extent. And now he’s in charge of the police and he is very much pushing the police to be more and more aggressive towards the protestors. So far, again, except for the last Wednesday where the police actually started throwing shock grenades on protestors in the middle of Tel Aviv. And a couple of dozen were actually injured, you know, lightly injured and somebody even lost his ear. Otherwise, so far the police has handled it pretty well, again, against the pressure from above, but I worry that if it will continue, things will escalate. This Thursday was declared as a day of unrest and protests throughout the country. And I expect it to be pretty rough.
And let’s talk about, you know, what I think for many of us in the diaspora was a really tragic moment, you know, in the kind of the weeks that we’ve had, and that was the situation in Huwara last weekend. And, you know, the response of the settlers to the terror attack that killed several Israelis, and you know, what the actions were that followed, but also then the actions of the police and the IDF, and then, you know, I read today that already, the people who had been detained, the charges are being lessened and lessened. I mean, how much of that is a response to the extreme fractions in the coalition being emboldened and those in in society in Israel who may have wanted to take those steps, and how much of this do you think can be pulled back?
Well, I mean, first of all it was a, you know, a devastating un-Israeli, un-Jewish response, a devastating terror attack that took the lives of two brothers and a shocking event. And two wonderful brothers, one of them, I think was an officer in the Navy. Then the response was really despicable, racist, ugly criminal going into this village and burning homes and cars, and so on. And the military was found unprepared and the military generally finds it difficult to sort of tame settler violence. And so this case was really sort of clearly beyond anything that can be justified. And unfortunately, Smotrich the Finance Minister, again, it comes from a very radical party, actually liked a post that said something in the order of one should wipe out this village. So this is a finance minister, and Ben-Gvir, the Homeland Security Minister, it took him ages, if at all, to say anything against those acts. So yeah, I mean, I say, it’s a pretty embarrassing situation that we have such people at such key positions. Netanyahu himself spoke against that, although he sort of created an analogy between that and the protestors against the judicial overhaul. So Carly, I can say that I’m very impressed by the way our leadership handled the events of this week, but I guess this is also part of our democracy.
And we like to always reassure ourselves and when, you know, you and other organisations do these kind of trust polls and who do people have faith in in institutions that actually, you know, the IDF as an institution is one that that is often seen as somewhat kind of separate and above from politics. I saw that the IDF Chief of Staff is meeting today and tomorrow with, you know, key leaders and reservists to talk about this. You know, how do you see the IDF playing, if any, a kind of stabilising role here or, you know, stepping in if there becomes to be a problem with the rule of law, you know, where do you see the IDFs role?
Well, obviously the IDF is, you know, it’s leadership is very committed to sort of ensuring the rule of law. They have increased challenges. Part of the coalition, the negotiate agreement was also the demand of Ben-Gvir to split up the authority over the civic administration in the area C and so on. And the civil coordination, vis-a-vis the Palestinian authority. So not the defence minister will control all of that, but rather Smotrich because he basically wanted to be able to sort of benefit the settlers and so on. So I mean, it’s a quite a messy situation and we have to see whether those messy coalition agreements will actually be complied with or denied. So it’s still, I would say it’s an event that is unfolding and it’s too early to tell. I can say the, you know, whether it’s reassuring that we have a chief of staff, a Major General Herzi Halevi who’s the best Israeli possible for the job. So I trust him to handle this delicate and difficult situation properly.
So I almost want to return to where we started and we could do this for another two or three hours, or I certainly could, but I know you haven’t had dinner and you need to go and read the leaked document from President Herzog, but you know, to listen to you for the last hour, which has been-
I might have seen it before it was leaked.
I would imagine so. We’ll see which bits of yours they red-lined. But you know, to listen to you, you would struggle to understand that anybody is in support of this other than the extreme radicals within the coalition, but there are those in the country who are supportive of this. You know, there is the Kohelet Policy Forum that has been, you know, somewhat kind of subcontracted on behalf of the coalition to argue the points here, you know what-
Also, they have now reservations and they think that needs to be mellowed and that agreement needs to be achieved.
That’s a little bit too little too late. But, you know, where do you want to perhaps acknowledge at this stage that there may be some, you know, some moments or that you see as any positives that come out of this in the sense of, you know, this is a difficult hour to hear, and for those of us who are incredibly committed to Israel and its future, even from from the US or the UK, this is a very hard moment to watch. You know, what do you see as perhaps the light at the end of the tunnel as President-
Well, I mentioned before that it’s a moment of democratic awakening. So it’s sort of created a moment that forces us to sort of deal with the challenges. The fact that we didn’t have a constitution has been a fact since the foundation of the state for almost 75 years. Those events and this sort of combination of interests is now forcing us to deal with this fact. And again, I believe that whether within a few weeks or a few months, or a few years, we will stabilise our constitutional nature. So this sort of realisation will bring about the much needed constitutional moment. And I hope this moment, by the way, to connect it to other discussions will not only stabilise the checks and balances in our rights, but also in that instance also the electoral system. And it will sort of prepare our vehicle for the next 75 years rather than driving it directly into a wall.
So I want to recommend that everybody visit the IDI website because we really could have spent an hour on every single component of this. And there is normally a briefing on any piece of it you may be looking to understand whether it’s how judges are currently appointed or perhaps what some of the roads ahead may look like. Yohanan, it’s been incredibly helpful to hear from you. And I know that there is a lot of other material that people can explore further. I hope for your sake, this doesn’t go on for another couple of years or you may never eat dinner again, but we are… We grateful for the work.
I didn’t ate much in the last few weeks.
We are grateful for the work that you and your team are doing to try and help, you know, stabilise Israel during these challenges and hopefully as you say, bring about a more positive, stable resolution. And thank you everybody very much for joining us and we’ll let Yohanan go eat.
Thank you very much for having me and thank you all. And if it’s appropriate also to thank the Kirsch Family and Foundation for this partnership.
Thank you, goodbye for now, Yohanan.