David Makovsky
The Biden Middle East Visit: An Assessment and a Look Ahead

I think part of it is be careful of grand American designs. This is not the kind of presidency that comes in saying it will bring democracy to the Middle East. Even Obama was associated with trying to do something very dramatic to create distance in the wake of 9/11 between the mainstream Muslim community and Muslim militants. But each one I think had a more transformative kind of vibe to it. Biden wasn’t here to transform, he was there to engage. He sees foreign policy as an important point more than others do, as about leaders having personal relationships and engaging on that level. He spent his whole career in the Senate as the chairman of the House of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So he always feels he has a flair for foreign policy. The United States deals with China, and a lot of countries whose human rights records we don’t always agree with, but the importance of engagement has its own value and diplomacy. And when you talk to his people as I do, it’s clear that they are more about keeping your feet on the ground.

I think that’s an important question because I think progressives are not going to define America’s policy towards the Middle East. We released our intel report about Khashoggi on who we thought was responsible, which the progressives very much wanted. We made our views known but we want to recalibrate the relationship, we’re not out to boycott the relationship. That’s not the real world, the Saudi is a key player for the US. It’s in part trying to avoid this vacuum that China will fill if we stay away. So I think on that point, it was a big message to the progressives. On foreign policy, you’re not going to define American foreign policy to the Middle East, and on Israel, we know you don’t care for Israel, but Biden will embrace Israel. And I think if you look at what they call the Jerusalem Manifesto, the Jerusalem Declaration, it is a manifesto of what I would call the Biden Democrats and not the progressives. What separates him from the Obama era is that he doesn’t like to air dirty laundry. And you could say the Israelis kind of repay the favour on the Iran nuclear issue, which is we have differences, but we, US and Israel, discuss them behind closed doors. He’s very much, I would say an old-guard Democrat who believes in personal relationships, solving difficult issues behind closed doors, that’s the way you get things done. You don’t just issue press releases and make yourself feel good.

I tend to think the securities services in Israel have originally assumed there would be a deal and they thought the key is to get the uranium out of the country because they’re enriching at 60% and 90% is full military-grade enrichment and that only takes two weeks. From 60 to 90 is no time, most in the public don’t realise that. Time is on the side of the people who use time best and upgrade Israel’s offensive capabilities, so Israel’s position for a post-JCPOA world. But the political view doesn’t take the military view that a bad deal is better than no deal. They think maybe we could talk to the United States and get them to shift gears out of this deal into a much higher-level deal that deals with things like snap inspections, ballistic missiles, no sunset, and then maybe do like more for more, which is to lift sanctions on Iran if they have unlimited sunset. Sunset means that you phase out restrictions. Israel doesn’t want Iran to phase out of restrictions, that’s the main point. And no sunset on enrichment restrictions that are supposed to be phased out by 2030, 2031. So right now, it looks like Iran overplayed its hand and by insisting the IRGC, the Revolutionary Guards is a part of the deal. The Biden people say, “What does this have to do with nukes?“ And though, you know, they clear that they want that ‘cause, you know, their guy Soleimani was killed. So they feel that this gets them protection if they’re taken off the foreign terrorist list of the State Department. And the US said like, "Come on, man. This has nothing to do with this and you want to just keep pushing your luck and overplay your hand, no, the answer is no.” So it’s at an impasse. Will Iran pull back? I don’t think Biden, when we’re talking about also an election year or, you know, the midterms, I don’t see him giving, I think it also offends his sensibility in many ways. Your point about Hezbollah is an important one because if I was a journalist trying to follow the story, I would want to follow what happens on the Israeli-Lebanese maritime border. This might sound boring to people, technical, but it isn’t technical because Israel is drawing gas from its eastern Mediterranean positions. It would like Lebanon to have that ability believing it would stabilise it. Hezbollah would think twice before destabilising one of the only sources of income Lebanon’s going to get. It’s a completely failed state, we saw with the bombing of the Beirut port. And we see the Saudis don’t want to put much money into the French, the two countries that put money in Lebanon. So I think there’s enormous pressure on Hezbollah now to agree even though they fire these unarmed drones towards Israel. We’re hearing rumours that they are backing Lebanon to cut a deal to find the line. Once you have a line, then Chevron or Shell or whoever it is, can do the exploration, and Israel will see that as a stabiliser. So I think we’re in a countdown between now and September because I think that’s been when it’s talked that if there’s a deal, I don’t know if it happens at the UN General Assembly when Lebanon and Israel are there, maybe there’s no joint signing ceremony because it’s a border. It’s just the US and Lebanon and Israel and the US, but this is, to me, one of the next shoes to drop. So I would say follow this space. I’m not here predicting a deal, I want to be careful, but I’m saying if you want to know what is one of the next developments to look for, I think the Lebanon space is one of the places I’d look at.