Judge Dennis Davis
The League of Nations and the Mandate

Judge Dennis Davis | The League of Nations and the Mandate

- Good evening, good afternoon to everybody. I gather it’s very hot in the northern hemisphere. It’s rather colder down here in Cape Town, but here we are and I have been asked to basically talk to some considerable extent about the mandate which flowed, the mandate which the British had after the First World War in so far as Palestine is concerned, and where of course the League of Nations played a considerably important role. My job tonight, therefore, is, effectively, or should I say, the lecture tonight, more accurately, really seeks to do two things. I’d like to just talk a little bit about the League of Nations because without that, nothing else makes sense. And then I’m going to focus in effect on two documents, both of which have proved to be quite central in the history leading up, if you were, to where we are today in many ways. But certainly the two documents which were really central to so much of the diplomatic disputes, of controversies which took place right through the interwar period, and indeed, until 1948 when the state of Israel was formed. But just this talk then a little bit about the League of Nations, which as all of you would know, was the predecessor to the United Nations, and which operated between 1920 finally being, sorry, being effectively abolished in 1946 with the rise of the United Nations headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and was really very much the brainchild of President Woodrow Wilson who was determined following the First World War and the extraordinary amount of death that occurred during that particular war to prevent another war, and therefore to seek to establish a body which would be able to peacefully preserve national sovereignty, territorial rights, and reduce the use of military weapons.

And so the League of Nations was founded in 1920 by 42 countries. At its height, between ‘34 and '35, there were 58 countries who were members of the League of Nations spanning the globe, including most of Southeast Asia, Europe, and South America. Of course, as one needs to note, nearly all of Africa at that time consisted of colonies of Western powers. Very significantly, the United States never joined the League of Nations because, and how is this of a shadow which now looms over us because of the possibility of Mr. Trump coming back into the White House? At that time, the isolationist policy, particularly, in the US Senate, was such that Woodrow Wilson’s dream of having a League of Nations which would deal with all of these questions, they refused to ratify the League’s charter. And accordingly, I think that was probably one of the central features by which the League of Nations actually failed to rarely take traction. It did have some success. It negotiated settlements to territorial disputes between Sweden and Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Greece, and Bulgaria. It also successfully administered the former territory, colonies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire, and we’ll get back to that if I may. Significantly, it was probably one of the first organisations which dealt with humanitarian law aiding refugees, trying to end slavery in the drug trade, setting standards on working conditions. It basically established the permanent Court of International Justice, which is a precursor to today’s International Court of Justice, ICJ, which we’ve spoken about a lot, tried to prevent malnutrition, diseases.

It was essentially a precursor, if you wish, to the World Health Organisation, and was also the precursor to UNESCO, preserving cultural preservation and scientific advancements. The problem with it was that it couldn’t do anything to stop the '35 invasion of Ethiopia by Italy, the annexation of the Sudetenland and Austria by Germany and the invasion of Manchuria, the northern Eastern Chinese province by the Japanese in '32, and ultimately, therefore was stillborn. But just to give some more content to it, I thought let’s just have a look at a brief video which sets this all out in more graphic detail than I could perhaps present to you. So if we could have the little video now, that would be great. Doesn’t seem to be connected.

• [Speaker] I’m going to try to reload it. Just one moment.

• Okay, if not, I’ll carry on. It’s fine.

• If the Paris Peace Conference marked a new beginning, the League of Nations was to provide the framework for the new world order. The first time in history, the nations of the world would unite in a world organisation. Now this is one of the iconic photos of the Paris Peace Conference. It shows the four political leaders that determined the fate of the conference in many respects. Clemenceau from France, Wilson from the United States, Lord George from Britain, and the Italian Prime Minister, Orlando. Now these four, Wilson was the main supporter of the League idea. Wilson was , and that this League would be the centrepiece of the Paris Peace Settlement. The British government went along, but Lord George was more ambivalent, and Clemenceau famously said that he liked the League, but he did not believe in it. But the momentum for setting up a world organisation was enormous. League of Nations associations had formed in many countries and they were preparing draught proposals. “The Great Caravan of Humanity is once more on the march,” wrote the South African General Smuts in his practical proposal, a pamphlet that became the blueprint for the League. And it’s here in Paris where it all happened. Most of the discussions that led to the adoption of the covenant took place over there, just 10 minutes at the Place de la Concorde, And the first meeting of the council of the League of Nations took place just over there in the building with the two flags, which houses the foreign office of the French government. Setting up the League was the first and primary task of the peace conference. Before beginning to discuss the terms of the peace, the League commission, chaired by Wilson himself, discussed the terms of the future world order, and while the conference would wrangle for months over details of the Peace Settlement, agreement on the League of Nations was reached within weeks.

So already in mid-February 1919, the League Commission presented a covenant of the League of Nations, the founding creed of the first world organisation. This as a copy of the Covenant printed in 1919. The covenant outlined the shape of the new organisation and defines its powers. It made clear that the League would not be a but an association of independent members, but still very new in international relations. There had been international organisations and arrangements before, but now for the first time, the states of the world created a permanent organisation with a broad mandate: To promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security, as the covenant formulated it. This permanent organisation had permanent organs, an assembly, a council and a secretariat, and these would give it a measure of autonomy from national governments. The League did not have, as would soon become clear, sufficient clout to achieve international peace and security, but it propelled international cooperation into a new era. Framework of the League, committees and commissions would be set up to address social and humanitarian concerns, to codify international law and to facilitate corporation and scientific and economic methods. In some of this, the League built on earlier attempts at international collaboration, but for the first time there was now a hub for international cooperation, a centre for harmonising the actions of nations as the United Nations Charter would later call it. It was clear that something very new in international politics was beginning. Lord Robert Cecil, its most ardent supporter in Britain, called the League a great experiment. In many respects, that experiment did not succeed, but it had to be tried, if only so that the founders of the United Nations, the next world organisation would learn from it. The League is widely seen as a failure today. It did not stop, also was right not to believe in it, but it was an exciting experiment and it’s one worth rediscovering as we shall see.

• I do apologise for the quality of the sound. I thought it’d be a lot better. I do apologise. The point I simply tried to make was that this was the first body thanks to Woodrow Wilson, which tried to deal with international conflict, and of course it failed, failed unanimously, for all the reasons that I’ve already advanced, effectively, being abolished in '46. But clearly the die was cast long before that and by the time that Hitler invaded the Sudetenland, it was perfectly clear that the League of Nations was going to have very, very little traction and the failure of it to have attracted America proved to be particularly fatal. But you could see, at least hopefully, that the structure of the League was of course important and influential in ultimately reconceiving of it in a somewhat more powerful and expansive way to the United Nations. One of the reasons why I needed to tell you all of this was because one of the issues within the League, which I’ve already prefigured, was that it had the system of establishing a mandatory system, the guiding principle of which was the wellbeing and development of inhabitants of certain ex-enemy colonies and territories. It was to be guided by a mandatory power on behalf of the League. And until these countries achieved independence of states or became parts of states, the mandated areas which include parts of Africa and the Middle East, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Tanganyika, Southwest Africa, Naro, and New Guinea, just to name a few, all were under a system of the mandate, which meant that the League of Nations was a supervisory body which would look and hold accountable those countries to whom the mandated authority had been granted.

And of course, the one that we are interested in in relation to this lecture are the articles of mandate, which were set out in considerable detail, considerable detail in so far as what was then referred to as Palestine was concerned. And it’s important therefore, before we even look at the text of this mandate, which is really interesting in itself, we need perhaps to look at two documents which proved to be utterly central to the process of the mandate and to the history which unfolded during this particular period. The one you know all very well, and that of course is the famous letter of Arthur James Balfour, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, to Lord Rothchild. Quote, “His Majesty’s government views with favour, "the establishing Palestine of a national home "for the Jewish people "and will use their best endeavours "to facilitate the achievement of this object, "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done "which may prejudice the civil and religious rights "of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine "or the rights and political statuses enjoyed "by Jews in any other country.” And of course, that letter dated the 2nd of November, 1917, published both in “The Times” and the “Jewish Chronicle” a week later. The second document, which is probably less well known, if we can put this up now as the little text which I asked to put up so we can all read it together. Okay, this comes from a particular book. It’s the second page where, I’m sorry, my useless technological skills meant I didn’t put both of them, but let me explain this letter to you.

This is a letter or the fundamental part of the text of a letter from Sir H. McMahon, M-C-M-A-H-O-N, His Majesty’s high commissioner in Egypt to the Sharif of Mecca, dated October the 24th, 1915. Now let me just give some context to this and perhaps this context is known to to you all because as I understand it, David Pima gave a lecture on Lawrence of Arabia a few nights ago, and that’s the context in which I just want to focus on for a moment. because the context in which McMahon’s letter was generated was this, that the British in their battle against the Ottoman Empire and their attempt to control, as it were, the Arabian Peninsula, at one particular point in time, and perhaps to some extent the role of, of T.E. Lawrence was important here, was to ensure that the Arab nations, as it were, would come to the support of the British military expeditions, which were seeking to rout the Ottomans from this particular area and therefore end their colonial rule. And in order to do this, and there’s a very, I think, interesting new book by Randolph Fiennes on Lawrence of Arabia, which does a really good job of contextualising this all if you’re interested. The British therefore sought to encourage Arab cooperation by promises that they were made insofar as what would happen to these territories if the British was successful in winning the war against the Ottomans. And so the letter begins by saying, “I have realised that ever from your last, "you regard the question as one of vital importance.” That’s the question of what’s going to happen.

And then he says this, this is McMahon saying, “I have therefore lost no time in informing the government "of Great Britain of the contents of your letter "and it is with great pleasure "that I communicate you on their behalf "the following statement, which I’m confident "that you will receive with satisfaction. "The two territories of Messina, Alexandretta, "and portions of Syria aligned to the western districts "of Damascus, Holmes Hammer and Aleppo, "cannot be said to be purely Arab and should "be excluded from the limits demanded. "With the above modification "and without prejudice to our existing treaties "with Arab peace, we accept those limits. "As for those regions lying within those frontiers, "wherein Great Britain is free to act "without detriment to the interests of our ally, France, "I’m empowered in the name of the government "of Great Britain to give you the following assurances "and make the following reply to your letter: "One, subject to the above modifications, "Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support "the independence of the Arabs in all "of the regions within the limits "demanded by the Sharif of Mecca. "Great Britain will guarantee the holy places against "all external aggression and will recognise "the inviability. "And three, when the situation amidst Great Britain "will give to the Arabs her advice "and will assist them to establish what may be "to be the most suitable forms "of government in those various territories.”

Now, I can’t tell you how much controversy this particular letter actually elicited, because the real question was that what McMahon was taken to have done was to have promised the Sharif of Mecca that when the war was over, Britain would recognise the independence of Arabs in these territories. That was clearly common cause. The question is what was meant by carving out the two districts in Messina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo? Because the argument was that they were not going to be, as it were, part of the promise given in paragraphs one, two, and three, which you have in front of you. And so the, and this is a really important debate because if I could put it this way, the Zionist movement led magnificently during this entire period Bahai via Dr. Chaim Weizmann, on the one hand, using the Balfour Declaration, which I’ve already made reference as the yardstick, obviously, they sought certain claims with regard to the establishment of a home for Jews, that we would have Israel, and the Arabs on the other hand, they relied on this particular document of McMahon to say, “You, the British, have promised us that we "will have nation states after the war "because that’s how you enticed us to cooperate with you "and fight on your side during the First World War.” All the difficulties about the fact that, to some considerable extent, the Ottoman Empire was probably more closely aligned to Islam than, for obvious reasons, than what the British were paid off.

And the dispute was what was meant by this carving out of the districts, west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. And the argument was did this include Palestine or not? And the Arab view was that it did not, and the view of Great Britain was to equivocate, and the view of the Zionist movement was that this was not promised to the Arabs. And if you really want to know what lay at the heart of so much of the dissent during this period, British equivocation, double standards if you wish, speaking out of both sides of their mouth and promising to each side is very much at the heart of the particular problem. Now, I needed to tell you this because it’s important to understand this context when we now look at the mandate, because to go back to the mandate which I had spoken about insofar as that which was guaranteed by the League of Nations was concerned, here, there was no doubt about it that the document that took primacy of importance was the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the special privileges granted to the Jewish community in Palestine, which had begun in 1918 with the appointment of the Zionist Commission headed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, And there was no question that that was the context in which the British rule, which was for two years a military administration giving way to a civil administration in September, 1920, right, that was what the tensions were all about. But before we get there, right, let us look just briefly at the 28 articles, which were part of, which were the mandate which were had been granted by the League of Nations for Palestine, and which was supposed to reflect the commitment of Britain, as it were, to guiding these particular ex-enemy colonies of which Palestine, yes, the one that we’re focusing on for obvious reasons towards some level of independence.

I should add that the accountability mechanism of the League of Nations at the time was an organisation called the Permanent Mandates Commission, was part of the League of Nations, located in Geneva. And it met regularly discuss the fulfilment of the object set down for all of the mandates in operation. Each of them had a mandate. Of course, those of you who come from South Africa will know that there was a huge controversy with regard to the question of Southwest Africa, it was then called Namibia now, and the South African mandate over that, which went to the World Court in two separate occasions, but we’re not, that’s not my topic for tonight. But it was this permanent Mandates Commission which essentially was the mechanism which rendered Britain accountable to the mandate. Now, I’m not going to read through all 28 articles of the mandate. That would be, that really would test anybody’s patience, but just let’s have a look at a couple of them to give you an idea of the thrust of the mandate. And I want to come back to the McMahon letter in relation to that. The preamble says the following: “Whereas the principled Allied Powers have always agreed "that the mandate should be responsible "for putting into effect the declaration originally made on "the 2nd of November, 1917 by the government of His Britannic Majesty, "adopted by the same powers, "in favour of the establishment in Palestine "of a national home for the Jewish people, "it being clearly understood "that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil "and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities "in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed "by Jews in any other country, "and whereas recognition has therefore "been given to these historical connection "of the Jewish people with Palestine into the grounds "for reconstituting their national home in that country.”

The mandate then confirms the following: “Article 2, the mandate that Britain shall be responsible "for placing the country under such political, "administrative and economic conditions "as will secure the establishment "of the Jewish national home as laid down in the preamble "and the development of self-governing institutions, "and also for safeguarding the civil "and religious rights of all the inhabitants "of Palestine irrespective of race and religion.” Article 4: “An appropriate Jewish agency "shall be recognised as the public body "for the purpose of advising "and cooperating with the administration "of Palestine in such economic, social, "and other matters as may affect the establishment "of the Jewish national home "and the interest of the Jewish population in Palestine. "The Zionist organisation, so long as it’s organisation, "constitutional in the opinion of the mandate appropriate "shall be recognised as such agency "it shall take steps in consultation "with His Britannic Majesty’s government "to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing "to assist in the establishment "of the Jewish national home.” And the rest of it continues, I’ll just read article 14. Article 14 says, “A special commission shall be appointed "by the mandatory to study, define, and determine the rights "and claims in connection with the holy places "and the rights and claims relating "to the different religious communities in Palestine. "The method of nomination, the composition, "and the functions of this commission shall be subject, "submitted to the council of the League for its approval, "and the commission shall not be appointed "or enter into upon its functions without "the approval of the council.”

What I’m trying to say, in short, is if you look at this particular document, there is absolutely no doubt that it gave effect to the Balfour Declaration, that the mandate which would be granted to Britain by the League of Nations had incorporated in express terms, terms which I think many people don’t really understand in terms of the history, that the Balfour Declaration was central. Now, in September, 1920, the first high commissioner for Palestine happened to be Jewish. Sir Herbert Samuel gave effect to the implementation of the Balfour Declaration with, and therefore, to the spirit purported objects of the mandate by issuing immigration ordinance law, which authorised the admission of 16,500 Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Now, immediately this occurred, the Arab leaders in Palestine expressed alarm. They perceived that the British were about to expropriate Arab-held land for the purpose of Jewish settlement, and that this would now make Palestine overwhelmingly Jewish. I might add that fear was never realised, no land was expropriated in this country. But the reality was that by May 1921, there were now the outbreaks of significant anti-Jewish violence in Jaffa. Jewish immigration was temporarily suspended. A British investigatory commission ruled that Arab fears were due to concerns about Jewish demographic growth. Now, to assure the Arab population of Palestine of Britain’s aim to be even-handed in managing the mandate, keep in mind what the mandate actually said, I might add. Winston Churchill, who was then the Colonial Secretary, published a white paper, effectively a policy statement, giving a precise interpretation of how the Balfour Declaration will be applied to Palestine’s future.

It asserted that its goal was not to make Palestine wholly Jewish and subordinate to the Arab population, and significantly, it tied the rate of Jewish immigration to, quote, the economic absorptive capacity of the country to absorb immigrants. In short, the British, as it were, not withstanding the mandate, not withstanding the fact that the mandate had given express content, as I’ve indicated in all the clauses, are real, 28, if you want, but you cannot, I think, get away from that particular proposition. The idea was clear that that the Balfour Declaration now had to be given content. It is true that, right, that the whitepaper, which was illustrated, which I’ve spoken about, now started to have to deal with the problem that I’ve already alerted you to: The McMahon correspondence. Because whilst the mandate clearly indicated that the Balfour Declaration was the primary document driving the process, as I’ve said, meanwhile back at the ranch, the British had clearly made some promises to the Arab countries and it is incredible how much effort and time went into interpreting what McMahon had actually promised or not. And so just to indicate precisely the line of my argument, the whitepaper, to which I made reference in Churchill, right, allowed Churchill to provide an interpretation of that command correspondence which asserted this: “It is not the case as has been presented "by the Arab delegation that during the war, "His Majesty’s government gave an undertaking "that an independent national government should be once "established in Palestine.”

This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th of August, sorry, October, 1915 from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty’s High Commissioner in Egypt to the Sharif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hajj. The letter is, quote, “is conveying the promise "to the Sharif of Mecca to recognise "and support the independence of the Arabs "with the territories proposed by him.” But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope amongst other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty’s government as covering the Vilayet of Beirut and the independence Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was as excluded from Sir Henry McMahon’s pledge. Now the Arabs contested this, and of course, the way they contested it was to say the letter to which I’ve made references, which are sitting on your desk as it were here 'cause you all have it, that that was actually written in Arabic and if you read the Arabic version and the definition of whatever vilayet was, as opposed to a district, the letter didn’t make entire sense to suggest that all of Palestine was excluded from the promise that that McMahon had made. And it’s perhaps for this reason that Sir Martin Gilbert, who amongst other things of course, was Churchill’s official biographer, wrote, quote, “The centrepiece of British mandatory policy "was the withholding of representative institutions "for as long as it was in Palestine an Arab majority.”

In other words, even though there had been the promise clearly indicated by the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, number one, because of this other side, this other correspondence which had been heavily contested precisely what it meant, that’s McMahon, and two, because the British were particularly concerned about the Arab majority thereof, Gilbert himself says that the centrepiece of their policy was withholding of representative institutions. And it does seem to me, if I may just say that it’s probably for that reason that that the following sort of exchange took place between Churchill, the colonial secretary at the time, and Weizmann writing as I’ll indicate by way of an interview to “The Times.” Churchill said, “I have decided to go "to the ultimate possible length in giving them "the Arab delegation, Palestine delegation, "representative institutions without falling into a position "where I could not fulfil those pledges "to which we were committed by the Zionist policy. "I’m bound to retain in the hands "of the imperial government "the power to carry out these pledges. "I have ever strongly urged the Arabs "to take part in the new elective council "and to bring their critical faculty "to bear upon all questions connected with the government "of the country and with immigration.” Weizmann, who clearly had extraordinary sensitivity to the hole which the British had dug themselves and which therefore were creating enormous tensions between Arabic and Jewish populations at the time for all of the obvious reasons, wrote to “The Times” in a letter on the 1st of March, 1922. Reads as follows: “We do not seek to found the Jewish state.

"What we want is a country in which all nations "and all creeds are equal rights and equal tolerance. "We cannot hope to rule in a country "in which only one-seventh of the population present "are Jews. "By the establishment of a national home, "we mean the creation of such conditions in Palestine today "as will enable us to move large numbers "of Jews into the land to settle in there, "to render themselves supporting. "And last, Britain, last but not least, "to establish schools, universities, "other Jewish institutions that the country may become "as quickly as possible as Jewish as England is English. "I see no reason,” he continued, “for differences between us "and the Arab non-Jew population. "There is plenty of room for us both in Palestine. "It’ll hold five or six million if properly developed, "whereas the present population is less than 700,000. "It’s not likely that there’ll ever be "an Arab question in Palestine. "Non-Jew need not fear that they’ll suffer at our hands. "For 2000 years, we have known what it meant "to be strangers. "We Jews know the heart of a stranger. "Are we likely to deal out oppression?” he asks. “Moreover, we have never proposed "that a Jewish minority should rule over the rest. "Palestine will only become "a Jew self-governing commonwealth when the majority "of its inhabitants are Jewish.”

And so what I’m suggesting is that, at that stage, obviously Weizmann took a cautious approach, recognising the tensions which existed. But the take- home points, for what it’s worth, the take home point unquestionably is the fact that for the British themselves, there was this incredible, as it were, controversy brewing all the time. And I’m not going to take you through all of the correspondence in this particular connection. Suffice to say that we know that these tensions continued throughout the mandated period. And we also know that finally 15 years later, in 1937, the cabinet of of Britain basically constituted the Peel Commission, and its report was published on the 8th of July, 1937, to deal with what was becoming an increasing problem of both sides claiming, with textual support, as I’ve indicated, is that their claim was the preference claim. And according to the Peel Commission, the underlying causes of the disturbances were twofold: The desire of the Palestinians for independence and their hatred and fear of the establishment of a Jewish national home. The Peel Commission recognised that a unity state could not be created out of the contradictory obligations contained in the Balfour Declaration, and I might add, in the McMahon letters. And it went on to recommend the partition of the country into Jewish state, the Palestinian state, to be incorporated by and enclaves to registered for the mandate. In truth, that, as one historian has said, all the vital strategic areas in Palestine were to remain in British hands under an emasculated form of the old mandate.

The Peel Commission, in drawing up their report, seems to have been concerned with the vulnerable nature of the British strategic position as with finding a viable solution to Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. In short, the mandate which had been given to Britain was effectively due to controversy from the very beginning, because before the mandate, the McMahon correspondence, as interpreted by the Arabs with some credence, I have to think, and I’m not going to go through that, but with some credence, the fact of the matter was, they thought that they were entitled, Arabs, that they were entitled to Palestine. And I might just add, if I can, just one piece of correspondence in this regard, which emerged out of the colonial secretary’s office in 1937, sorry, 1939, 1939. “His Majesty’s government will get the misunderstanding "which has risen according to lack of precision "in the language used in the correspondence,” McMahon correspondence, “and the differences opinions "still exists. "For their part, they can only adhere "to the view that the whole "of Palestine west of Jordan "was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon’s pledge, "and they therefore cannot recognise "the claim based upon the McMahon correspondence "that Palestine should be converted "into an independent Arab state.” So there was recognition right throughout, and that was why on the one end, the Peel Dommission muted the idea of partition.

That was the first time that that really happened. But that they also wanted to keep the strategic parts to themselves because Britain at the same time was worried about the extent to which there were parts of Palestine that they regarded as sufficiently strategic, particularly the coastline, and on the other hand, having to deal with legitimate aspirations on both sides, at least legitimate to the extent that the British should fuel those. So when we look at the upshots of the mandate, the mandate unquestionably promised Jews, promised us a homeland. It went further than that, because as I’ve indicated through the preamble in Articles Two and following, the mandate was there on the basis of the law, which had been, which was prevailing at the time, which was that the League of Nations had the authority to take over the ex-colonial states and provide a guidance. The mandate of the British government at that time was to provide the conditions in which a Jewish state would occur. Yes, at the same time, it had promised, in admittedly more ambiguous terms, and which could be interpreted both ways, but which even the British themselves over a long period of time, sort of approbated and reprobated about the contents of the McMahon correspondence, but which had certainly given the Arab leaders an expectation that it was entitled to Palestine. And it is remarkable when one reflects upon this particular history, because so much of these tensions are sourced in these documents. And I suppose what’s so important about this particular period of history for me is that it’s all very well, oh, but that happened almost 100 years ago.

But as we know, so much of the tensions that occurred occurred because during that particular period in particular with the rise of Zionism, the recognition of the legitimate aspirations of the Jews were stated through the Balfour Declaration and by the contradictory actions by a British government intent on enticing the Arabs into the war against the Ottoman Empire, a source of a huge amount of animosity actually arose. And if you read the Peel Commission’s report, '37 carefully, so much of that animosity can be sourced in this dastardly ambiguous policy, which was to the interest of Britain and which to a large degree was in nobody else’s interests. And I think that’s really the take home point of an important instructive but sad period of history. Let me see if I can, if there are any questions which require be answered.

Q&A and Comments:

Yeah, Jonathan, for perspective on the Paris Peace Conference, I recommend Paris '19 by Margaret MacMillan, who is the grandchild of Lloyd George, who by the way, if I can just make the point, Lloyd George was particularly as it were pro the Balfour Declaration, although he did say in 1937 to the Peel Commission, the idea was that a Jewish state was not to be set up immediately by the peace treaty without references to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a national home become a definite majority of the inhabitants, Palestine would become a Jewish commonwealth.

Yes, Warren, the mandate for Southwest Africa was almost, was a similar form of text. Of course there was no Balfour Declaration there. And of course, as you know, the South African government’s view at the time, let me put it this way, the Apartheid government’s view was essentially that they almost, that once the League of Nations had gone, that supervisory commission to which I’ve made reference, would no longer exist and therefore to a large degree, southwest Africa, as it then was under the control of South Africa, and that the United Nations was not a legally entitled successor thereto, which of course was proved to be internationally wrong.

Oh, the book which I referenced from the text, which is a book which is very controversial but at least has all of these McMahon letters, is a book by Peter Shambrook called “Policy of Deceit.” There’s a lot about that book that I think is historically incorrect, but it was the easiest way that I could find the McMahon letters.

Yes, Sykes was a representative, and of course he himself had a particular problem in this particular regard, quite right, Kelvin.

Serena, the League of Nations gave a similar mandate to Japan, yes, it did, over Micronesia in order to take it away from Germany. But interesting to compare how they operated in mandates. Micronesia, which I visited, is now an independent country, voted pro-Israel every single time. But in World War 2, Japan uses islands as stepping stones to extend their hold over the whole Pacific Ocean, including Pearl Harbour. I think what we can conclude from that too, Serena, is that the League of Nations, for all of the reasons that I’ve advanced really wasn’t particularly successful and that these mandates reflected so much so a colonial view of the world, that, you know, you take the uncivilised countries and make them civilised.

Yes, there is, sorry, I’m just trying to get down to, oh, sorry, the League of Nations included both Palestine and Jordan, there was . Yes, quite right.

Q: Does it matter legally that the Balfour Declaration, as mentioned, used to have a Jewish homeland?

A: Well, Philip, that’s the interesting question, is it not? It’s the interesting question because that’s been the debate as to what was meant, you know, as a Jewish homeland. But let’s just look at the text again, shall we. “His Majesty’s government views the establishment "in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, "and will use their best endeavours "to facilitate the achievement of this objective, "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done, "which may prejudice civil and religious rights "of existing non-Jewish communities.” It seems to me that when they were talking about a national home, they were talking about a state. I agree that Weizmann was very cautious at the beginning because he understood in very dextrous terms what the political climate in Britain and ambiguity was, and he didn’t want to push the door too hard. But I think, if you then read that text and the way it was translated through the mandate text, which I’ve already made reference and which nobody bothers to have a look at anymore, then I think I’m prepared to say, for one, that it was more than a homeland, it was a state.

Oh, that we are, sorry, yes, of course, Paula, that’s the letter when you say, “Couldn’t you say something to the effect, "Jews are not likely to deal out oppression,” that’s the letter that Weizmann penned by way of an interview really in “The Times,” “Times of London” of the 1st of March, 1922, in which he said into, earlier, perhaps I read it too quickly, but towards the end, just repeat" “It is not likely that there’ll ever be an Arab question "in Palestine. "Non-Jew need not fear "that they will suffer at our hands.

"For 2000 years, we have known what it means "to be strangers. "We Jews know the heart of a stranger. "Are we likely to deal out oppression? "Moreover, we’ve never proposed "that a Jewish minority should rule over the rest. "Palestine will only become "a Jewish self-governing commonwealth "when the majority of its inhabitants are Jewish.” It’s really very interesting that he said that then. I suppose, let me say, that was certainly the Zionism into which I was born and which perhaps has lived with me for the rest of my life. But I don’t want to say more.

Q: Harris, to ask, “Was the San Remo conference "empowered by the League of Nations, "make decision regarding the future "of the mandate? "Given the recommendations the Balfour Declaration, "the Peel commission, "why did the British prevent British immigration "from Europe before, during and after?”

A: That is a really interesting point. No, the San Remo conference really didn’t really add very much to the powers in relation to making decisions. But I will say this, that the British prevented Jewish immigration from Europe before the war unquestionably because, and during, and after, because of an extraordinary ambiguous policy. I think that the tension that I’ve tried to sketch and which has been the fundamental take home point of my entire lecture, that the ambiguity between, on the one hand making promises to McMahon, sorry, from McMahon, and which were, and if you look at the debates in the Commons during that period, there were people on both sides of the fence in relation to McMahon letters and McMahon himself had to write to “The Times” back in the thirties trying to clarify precisely what he’d said. But the fact that there was evidence to suggest that the Brits had said to the Arabs, well, you know, if you fight on our side in relation to the war that we have got against the Ottomans, we are going to be very generous to you, and then sought in part to claw back that, never done expressly, claw that back in order to accommodate the Balfour Declaration meant that they had created all sorts of tensions and clearly the Arab population was fearful of a majority Jewish rule, and the Arabs at the time, sorry, and the Brits at the time wanted to try to play a situation where they diffused the entire tension.

And so quite shamefully right through that period, they restricted Jewish immigration, right through, and you can, and after the war, inexplicably, given their inability to control the particular problems, and clearly they were realising that there was going to be an outbreak of greater tensions between the Jewish population and the Arab population, and I think it’s a stain of extraordinary shame on British history. One can only speculate how many more people would’ve been saved from the Holocaust had they done the decent thing.

Then you say, sorry, “Rodney Dennis’s book "Empire” says Britain “at the time thought of Jewish state, "possibly part of the empire.” Yes, they did, they did think it was loyal to Britain. But with respect, the Arabs had actually, and it’s not for me to be their advocate of reasons, but they themselves thought that they were doing the same thing by fighting on the size of the Brits and supporting Allenby, who recognised that.

“On meeting Ben Gurion in his home,” says Anna, “he expressed to us that forget the money, "just send us a population to inhabit our country.” Of course, his wife said, stop it, but yeah. Howard says, “Arabs were paid 50,000 gold sovereigns a month "to support Lawrence while Jewish populations "were not allowed to even get them out.” Yes, I accept that too. I accept that they did all sorts of deals with the Arabs, and indeed, if you read Randolph Fiennes’ book on Lawrence of Arabia, it’s all documented there and I would highly recommend that to you. It seems to me that I’ve covered all the questions. I think this is a really very interesting period of history. I hope you did as well, and I hope you, all of you in the Northern Hemisphere are managed to manage the heat, and we’ll see you soon in a different topic. Take care and good evening.